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European leaders promised the Western Balkan
states during the EU summit in Thessaloniki in
June 2003 that their future was within the united
Europe, and that each of them could prospec-
tively become an EU member1. But judging by
the actual steps taken by Brussels, the EU does
not intend to proceed with true integration of
the region in the nearest future. No road map for
negotiations was proposed in Thessaloniki, and
neither was even a tentative accession date
stated, although leaders of the Balkan five had
asked for this in a joint statement. The SAP,
a special association procedure developed specif-
ically for the integration of the Western Balkan
states, may even lead to a ÒfreezingÓ of the
Balkan countriesÕ integration at the initial level.
The same applies to the unclear position of these
states in the EU foreign policy instruments now
being developed (Wider Europe, New Neighbour-
hood Instrument). The situation looks even
worse in economic terms. The volume of funds
provided to the Western Balkans from the EU
budget has been decreasing for several years,
and will continue to decrease unless the EU
alters its policy. At the same time, substantially
larger amounts of funds are provided to neigh-
bours of the region, i.e. the acceding Slovenia
and Hungary, and Bulgaria and Romania Ð reci-
pients of pre-accession aid. This may deepen the
civilisational gap between the region and its
neighbours, stall economic growth in the
Western Balkans, and undermine the Balkan
societiesÕ confidence in European institutions.
As a result, populist parties with anti-EU pro-
grammes (extreme nationalist groups in most
cases) may win over a portion of the Western
BalkansÕ electorate. If Europe fails to take deci-
sive measures to truly integrate the Western
Balkans, the region, released from the spiral of
ethnic conflicts by the international communi-
tyÕs effort (the EU institutions and funds playing
a major role), may slip into another crisis, this
time civilisational in nature, and lose all chances
of integration with Europe in the foreseeable
future. 
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1. The special Balkan 
integration path
The Western Balkans is an EU term that has been
around since 1999. It refers to the area of Òthe
former Yugoslavia, less Slovenia, plus AlbaniaÓ
and includes five countries: Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (including
Kosovo), Macedonia and Albania. As yet, none of
these countries have acquired the status of an
EU applicant country. Since 1999, they have been
on a special integration path called the
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The
SAP is supposed to ultimately lead to the Balkan
statesÕ membership in the EU through the signa-
t u re of Stabilisation and Association Agre e m e n t s
(SAA), among other measures. However, it does
not provide for a guarantee that membership
negotiations will be opened within any specific
deadline2. Unlike in the previous association
agreements, the SAP is not part of the accession
process itself, but rather, an external instrument
for the integration of countries that have signed
the SAA with Brussels3. The SAP does not auto-
matically grant the states in question the status
of EU applicant countries, neither does it offer
them access to pre-accession funds4.
2. The burden of recent history
Ð stereotypes about the Balkans
After 1991, the region was affected by a series of
armed conflicts, which spared none of the We-
stern Balkan countries. These conflicts included
the over four years long war in Croatia and Bo-
snia, the guerrilla wars in Kosovo and Macedonia,
the NATO operation against former Yu g o s l a v i a ,
armed incidents in the ethnically Albanian so-
uthern Serbia in 2000, and the bloody riots that
accompanied the wave of anarchy in Albania in
1997. The wars have encumbered the perc e p t i o n
of the region to such an extent that even today it
continues to be seen as a politically unstable are a
and a recipient of foreign aid rather than a s e r i o-
us candidate for EU membership. This way of lo-
oking at the Western Balkans began to change
after the authoritarian regimes were toppled in
the two largest countries of the region (Serbia and
C roatia) in 2000, but change pro g resses slowly. 
The commonly overlooked fact today is that the-
re has been no open conflict in the Balkans since
the summer of 2001, and all ÒfrozenÓ conflicts no
longer threaten escalation, owing to the insi-
stent efforts of the international community and
equally insistent endeavours of the local autho-
rities and communities. In other words, conflicts
in the Balkans are no more ÒinflammableÓ today
than conflicts in the Basque Country or Northern
Ireland. Another fact that goes unnoticed is that
since the regimes in Croatia and Serbia collap-
sed, viable democratic institutions have been de-
veloping throughout the region and no country
is currently in danger of slipping back under au-
thoritarian rule5. The indefinite status of organi-
sms such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and
Montenegro or Kosovo is frequently invoked as
an argument in support of the claim that the co-
untries (regions) in question are unprepared for
integration with the European Union. We belie-
ve that this argument is false and that it is being
abused as a pretext to justify the failure to pro-
ceed with integration. The European Union will
soon have a new member Ð Cyprus Ð whose sta-
tus is probably equally difficult to resolve as the
situation of the countries named above. It was
the ethnic conflicts, deeply rooted in tradition
and mentality, that have led to the emergence of
Òindefinite status territoriesÓ in the Balkans fol-
lowing the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991. Now
the European Union, known for its respect for
minority rights and the expanding experience of
multiethnic peaceful co-existence, seems to be
the only place where the status of these coun-
tries or regions can ever be resolved. Left outsi-
de Europe, the Western Balkan countries will be
doomed to solving the indefinite status problem
the ÒtraditionalÓ way.
Another stereotype about the Balkan countries is
that they are totally corru p t i o n - r i d d e n6. The au-
thorities of the Western Balkan states endeavour
to crack down on corruption, and they seem to
have been quite successful. For example, the ma-
fia structures in Serbia were decimated as a re-
sult of a huge-scale police operation that follo-
wed the assassination, in 2003, of Prime Mini-
ster Zoran Djindjic, and the cigarettes smug-
gling and people trafficking from Albania and
Montenegro to Italy were curbed substantially. It
should be remembered that in the past, the EU
has entered into negotiations with countries
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commonly criticised for high levels of corruption
(Romania, Bulgaria), acting on the premise that
offering them membership prospects would the
best way to urge their authorities to eliminate
the informal structures7.
3. Between partnership 
and humanitarian aid
As a post-war region, the Western Balkans were
initially covered by humanitarian and recon-
struction aid programmes which aimed first of
all to reconstruct the economy, the market and
the infrastructure, rather than to adjust their
workings to the EU standards. All EU funding
currently received by the Balkans is provided un-
der the CARDS8 programme established to finan-
ce the SAP, which definitely focuses on Òrecon-
s t ru c t i o nÓ, rather than ÒintegrationÓ. As the
post-war reconstruction of the region advances,
the amounts funding are gradually reduced. Sin-
ce the Western Balkan countries do not have the
pre-accession status, CARDS funds cannot be re-
placed with EU funds earmarked for the adapta-
tion of applicant countries (or countries with si-
milar status) to EU standards. The scale of this
phasing out of reconstruction funds provided to
the five Western Balkan states is dramatic9.
At the same time, neighbouring countries rece-
ive growing amounts of EU funding. Consequen-
tly, the gap between the regionÕs economies and
the rest of Europe is widening rapidly. This is
evident in the comparison between the Western
Balkans and the two Balkan countries joining
the EU in 2007, namely Romania and Bulgaria. In
2006, Romania and Bulgaria will receive over
EUR 1.4 billion of pre-accession aid from the EU,
which accounts for 2.6 percent of these coun-
tries accumulated GDP. During the same period,
the five Balkan states will jointly receive EUR
500 million, which corresponds to 1 percent of
their GDP10.
In addition to this quantitative disadvantage, ke-
eping the five Western Balkan states in the posi-
tion of reconstruction assistance recipients and
refusing to promote them to the pre-accession
stage also has a substantial qualitative disa-
dvantage. Unlike pre-accession funds, re c o n-
struction funds are distributed without the re-
quirement for the recipientÕs budget to co-finan-
ce the projects, to get local administration invo-
lved in projects implementation11, or to use
a specified amount of materials provided by lo-
cal manufacturers, etc. All of these re q u i re-
ments, which are mandatory in the pre-acces-
sion mode, aim to stimulate economic growth,
create jobs, and urge the recipient country or re-
gionÕs local administration to take creative ac-
tion. Reconstruction funds may come (and frequ-
ently do come) exclusively from the EU (as the
co-financing requirement does not apply). Pro-
jects are carried out mainly by experts from the
EU countries, whose remuneration is astronomi-
cally disproportionate to the pay of local
experts, if any, working on the same project. Fi-
nally, there is no obligation to implement the
projects using goods or materials produced at le-
ast partly in the recipient country. This leads to
the formation of a secondary model of welfare
state in the post-communist countries (the for-
mer SFRY and Albania) where large sectors of the
society live on unemployment money12, disabili-
ty pensions or other welfare benefits financed
partly from foreign humanitarian aid. This con-
serves passivity as the prevalent social attitude.
In regions with a high concentration of foreign
personnel (whether military or civilian), a spe-
cial kind of elite has formed whose members
provide services to this special mode of foreign
ÒtourismÓ and want the present state of affairs
to be preserved as long as possible. Another hu-
manitarian gesture, i.e. the unilateral cancelling
of import duties on approx. 80 percent of com-
modities exported by the five Balkan states, has
also led to pathologies in some cases, like the in-
famous 2003 scandal which involved re-expor-
ting EU sugar provided as humanitarian aid,
back into the EU. 
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4. The European UnionÕs
current and future role 
in the Balkans 
The international communityÕs endeavours, in
which the EU member states provided the
lionÕs share of financing and military and civilian
personnel even when they remained passive di-
plomatically, have lead, or substantially contri-
buted to, the following developments:
Ð the suspension of (and, in practice, putting an
end to) the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herze-
govina (1996), Croatia (1995) and Kosovo (1999);
ÒfreezingÓ of the threatening armed conflict in
Macedonia (2001); and prevention of the outbre-
ak, towards the end of 2001 and in early 2002, of
an armed conflict in southern Serbia (the ethni-
cally Albanian Kosovo border);
Ð ÒcivilisingÓ the dispute between Belgrade and
Podgorica over the status of Montenegro;
Ð progress in the refugee returns in Croatia, and
especially in Bosnia (on a smaller scale, in Koso-
vo and Macedonia);
Ð stable economic growth, which most countries
of the region have reported for several years13;
and the implementation of market reforms aim-
ing to adapt the Balkan economies to WTO stan-
dards and, to a growing extent, to EU standards; 
Ð substantial reduction (even if the exact figures
be difficult to estimate) of the amount of contra-
band smuggled via the Balkans (including tobac-
co products, drugs and people), and in particu-
lar, a crackdown on cigarettes smuggling that
used to take place on a gigantic scale from Mon-
tenegro and Albania to Italy.
To some, usually large extent, Brussels may co-
unt the above achievements among the succes-
ses of its foreign policy.
The European Union gradually becomes the le-
ading player in the political map of the Balkans,
and in the near future it may become the only
major player there. Brussels aspires to this role
at a surprisingly late moment, given its bold mo-
ves at the time the socialist Yugoslavia was di-
sintegrating. In December 1991, the EU was the
first Ògreat powerÓ to recognise the independen-
ce of Slovenia and Croatia. Later on, however, it
was unable to single-handedly face the pro-
blems that emerged as a result of the outbreak of
wars in Bosnia, Croatia or Kosovo. The European
Union left the Balkan mandate in the hands of
the international community, represented for ad
hoc action by the so-called Contact Group com-
posed of the United States, Russia, Great Britain,
France, Germany and Italy. Whenever decisive
action was taken, including the armed opera-
tions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), the in-
itiative was always on the part of Washington.
When the war in Kosovo was over, however,
Brussels began to step in the United StatesÕ role
as the main player in the Balkans. Its major in-
dependent achievement was the development,
in 2002, of the compromise solution for Serbia
and Montenegro, under which the two countries
formed a confederation for a trial period of at le-
ast three years (the US was more inclined to sup-
port the separatist ambitions of Podgorica). Also
in 2002, the EU took over the Concordia mission
from NATO (Concordia monitors the cease-fire in
Macedonia). This was the first military mission
in the European UnionÕs history, soon to be follo-
wed by the policing mission in Bosnia and He-
rzegovina. At the moment, Brussels is preparing
to take over the SFOR mission in Bosnia from the
international community, and in future it also in-
tends to take over the KFOR in Kosovo14. Howe-
ver, both operations require much more funding
than policing or monitoring missions, which is
why the media are generally concerned about
whether Brussels will ever be able to do witho-
ut US troops15. As Russia has withdrawn its pe-
acekeeping contingent from the Balkans, and
the US, which has been gradually downsizing its
personnel in Kosovo and Bosnia for over two
years now, has announced a similar move, the
European Union is about to become the only ma-
jor player in the Balkans.
5. The specifically Balkan 
integration problems 
Integration of the Western Balkans will entail
new problems for Brussels, which it did not en-
counter in any of the applicant countries to date
and which stem from the violent recent history
of the region. These problems include the requ-
irement for the Balkan countries to co-operate
with the Hague Tribunal in the search for per-
sons suspected of war crimes, the emphasis on
enabling war refugee returns, and the question
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of the status of Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. 
5.1. Co-operation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yu g o s l a v i a
Co-operation with the Hague Tribunal is an is-
sue in the relations between the EU and the en-
tire region, excluding Albania and Macedonia.
For understandable reasons, some groups in the
society refuse to co-operate, reluctant to have
their compatriots tried by an international tribu-
nal or even sympathising with the accused who
remain in hiding. Nevertheless, co-operation is
progressing, the major success being the han-
ding over, in June 2001, of the former Serbian
president Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague Tri-
bunal. It is commonly believed that if the other
three main defendants from the Hague list, i.e.
the Croat general Ante Gotovina, the former Bo-
snian Serbs leader Radovan Karadic, and the JNA
commander, general Ratko Mladic, are handed
over, the Hague will informally approve of reco-
gnising the countries as meeting the accession
criteria under Justice and Home Affairs. The ac-
cused remain at large, though, and the authori-
ties of the countries where they are probably hi-
ding, being Croatia, the Serbian Republic (Bosnia
and Herzegovina) and Serbia, respectively, are
criticised for being Òdeliberately passiveÓ in the
search operations. 
5.2. The refugee problem
The refugee return movement is probably the
most difficult part of the Western BalkansÕ post-
war legacy. As a result of the war operations, mo-
re than 2.7 million people left their homes in Bo-
snia, Croatia and Ko s o v o1 6. Out of this number,
a p p rox. one million refugees have decided to re-
turn to date. The greatest exodus took place as
a result of the civil war in Bosnia (approx. 2.2 mil-
lion people). In 1995, 300Ð350 thousand Cro a t i a n
Serbs left the territory of Krajina occupied by the
C roatian army, and approx. 200 thousand Serbs,
and a smaller number of Romas, left Kosovo in
1999 for fear of persecution at the hands of the
Albanians. Bosnia has witnessed the greatest per-
centage of refugee returns. Nearly one million pe-
ople came back, though most of them (approx .
550 thousand) settled in areas controlled by their
own ethnic group (Serbs in the Serbian Re p u b l i c ,
C roats and Muslims in the Muslim-C roat Fe d e r a-
tion), i.e. not necessarily in the homes they inha-
bited before the war (majority returns). Some pro-
g ress has been reported recently (2000Ð2002) in
terms of returns to areas controlled by Òstran-
gersÓ (minority returns)17, as approx. 100 tho-
usand Croatian Serbs returned to Croatia. Howe-
ver, according to the Human Rights Watch ana-
lysts this number is exaggerated, since many
Serbs come to Croatia (and register their stay)
only to fix the formalities concerning the pro-
perty they have left behind, and then come back
to their current homes in Serbia, Montenegro or
the Serbian Republic18. The census of March 2001
showed that 201.6 thousand Serbs lived in Cro-
atia, accounting for 4.5 percent of the coun-
tryÕs population. This is three times less than in
the 1991 census19.
In addition to political factors (such as the reluc-
tance to assume the citizenship of ÒnewÓ states)
and social considerations (the fear of ostracism
in an ethnically different community), the re-
turns are impeded by difficulties with reclaiming
property left in the former place of residence (re-
al estate in particular). In Croatia and the two
constituents of Bosnia Ð the Muslim-Croat Fede-
ration and the Serbian Republic Ð it was a com-
mon practice to place a countryÕs ÒownÓ refuge-
es in the homes abandoned by refugees (e.g. Cro-
ats fleeing from the Serbian Republic would be
settled in Krajina, and Serbs from Krajina in the
Serbian Republic). In this situation, returning re-
fugees who face unanimous resistance of the lo-
cal community find it extremely difficult (and so-
metimes impossible) to reclaim their real estate
and evict the persons residing there presently,
even if they hold proper court judgements. Some
progress in this respect has been reported only
in Bosnia, which remains under control of the in-
ternational forces20. In the case of Croatia, there
is one more obstacle, namely the apprehension
of routine interrogations by the police and secret
services, which returning men who have, or may
have, served in the armed formations of the so-
called Republic of Serbian Krajina in 1991Ð1995,
must undergo.
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5.3. The status problem
5.3.1. Serbia and Montenegro
Montenegro was the only former Yugoslav repu-
blic that chose not to ÒdivorceÓ Serbia in 1991Ð
Ð1992 and has been suspended between cohabi-
tation and independence ever since, while its so-
ciety remains split, each option being supported
by approx. 40 percent of respondents21. Since the
team that has been in power in Podgorica for
a few years favours separation from Belgrade,
the country in fact enjoys a great deal of inde-
pendence, including a separate currency and po-
lice force, local taxation settlement, and a cu-
stoms border between the two states. The new
factor in the relations between Podgorica and
Belgrade is the growing aversion to the idea of
a joint state among the inhabitants of Serbia (ac-
c o rding to some polls, much more than 50 per-
cent of respondents are in favour of dissolving the
federation). In this context, the only thing that ke-
eps the two states together is the Òthree-year trial
c o h a b i t a t i o nÓ formula developed by Brussels in
2002. Unless the attitudes in both countries chan-
ge (which seems unlikely), in 2006 Serbia and
M o n t e n e g ro will carry out a peaceful separation,
p rovided that the EU does not object2 2. 
5.3.2. Ko s o v o
The difficulties with defining the ultimate status
of Kosovo stem from the very provisions of the
UN resolution No 1244. In 1999, the resolution
opened the way towards increased independen-
ce of this former autonomous Serbian province,
but at the same provided that Kosovo should re-
main an integral part of Yugoslavia (todayÕs Ser-
bia and Montenegro). Since Kosovo Albanians,
who account for 90Ð95 percent of KosovoÕs po-
pulation, generally want independence, all ef-
forts to keep the already de facto independent
Kosovo within Serbia seem doomed to failure.
A compromise solution with some chances of
successful implementation is the recent proposi-
tion for Kosovo to be included into the federa-
tion of Serbia and Montenegro as the third con-
stituent with equal rights. However, this forma-
tion will last, at best, only as long as the inter-
national community insists on the cohabitation
of the three communities. In March, Brussels de-
cided to enter into negotiations with the autho-
rities in Pristina on the inclusion of Kosovo into
the SAP, without consulting Belgrade on this is-
sue. This was a move that finally took account of
the reality, i.e. the impossibility to reach a com-
promise between the arguments of both sides23.
What prevents Brussels from recognising the au-
thorities in Pristina as an international subject is
probably the fear that as a result, Serbia might
abandon its pro-European policy. Such a scena-
rio, however, does not seem realistic24.
5.3.3. Bosnia and Herz e g o v i n a
The question of BosniaÕs status seems to be the
most difficult, in spite of the progress made in
terms of the restoration of human rights (faster
progress of refugee returns than in Croatia or Ko-
sovo). If the current status quo, i.e. the de facto
existence of two Bosnian states, got internatio-
nal recognition, this would be the first instance
of a recognised state borders alteration in post-
war Europe25. The international community, and
the EU in particular, will take all measures ava-
ilable to avert this decision. The results of the
parliamentary elections of November 2002 have
demonstrated that the policy whereby the inter-
national community ÒsewsÓ Bosnia together by
force has reached the limits of its potential. A re-
alistic compromise would be to preserve the cur-
rent status, i.e. the existence of both Bosnian
sub-states, with symbolic insignia of a federa-
tion, as long as possible26. The problem is that if
the international community recognised the au-
thorities of the Serbian Republic as an interna-
tional subject (even to a limited extent), they
would almost certainly strive to legalise the
Òspecial relationsÓ between the Serbian Republic
and Belgrade. The Bosnian Croats would respond
by coming up with a similar demand, calling for
the recognition of the authorities of ÒtheirÓ can-
tons (leading to a disintegration of the Muslim Ð
Croat Federation). The ultimate decision on the
status of Bosnia will have to provide some form
of separateness (autonomy?) to both Bosnian
minorities.
5.3.4. The status of Macedonia 
(the name problem) 
Greece claims an exclusive right to use the histo-
ric name of ÒMacedoniaÓ, even though over the
nearly 50 years of the socialist YugoslaviaÕs exi-
stence Athens tolerated the existence of this sta-
te as a federation constituent with a constitutio-
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nal right to secession. This dispute has led, in
the early 90s, to a diplomatic blockade of Mace-
donia. In 1993, the country was allowed to ope-
rate in the international scene under a bizarre
name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia, or FYROM. The only way out of this situ-
ation seems to be for the remaining EU Member
States to press Greece to change its position27.
The problem of the Albanian minority in Mace-
donia, on the other hand, has apparently been
solved by the formula of the Okhrid agreement
of 2001. It provided for an emancipation of the
minority in terms of political and civil rights (in-
cluding equal status for the Albanian language),
without any territorial autonomy. The Albanian
side, however, has criticised the speed and prac-
tice of implementation of these provisions. 
6. Re c o m m e n d a t i o n s
In May 2004, the EU will accept ten new mem-
bers, and towards the end of the year, Brussels
will probably decide to enter into accession ne-
gotiations with Turkey. In 2007, the other appli-
cant countries, i.e. Bulgaria and Romania, will
probably join in28. As a result, the only region
left in the map of Europe with uncertain future
prospects, in addition to regions whose acces-
sion has been postponed until an indefinite date
under the Wider Europe document29, will be the
Western Balkans. The Union may potentially fa-
ce difficulties after the upcoming great enlarge-
ment. Consequently, further enlargement plans
may be suspended, especially once Romania and
Bulgaria have been accepted. If, for instance, the
wave of job migration from the acceding coun-
tries to the ÒoldÓ members is higher than expec-
ted, this may effectively stall the enlargement
process. In order to prevent this, the political eli-
te in Brussels should take measures that are a lo-
gical continuation of the European UnionÕs com-
mitment in the Balkans to date. It should:
Ð promote the Western Balkans from the posi-
tion of a (reconstruction) assistance recipient to
the position of a partner in the process of Euro-
pean integration (a recipient of structural aid co-
financing the projects); 
Ð move countries of the region from the 4t h D i re c-
torate General (External Relations) to the 7t h D i-
rectorate General (Enlargement), i.e. grant them
the status of de facto applicant countries witho-
ut entering into negotiations with them, or even
without specifying the date for such negotia-
tions30. As a result, the Western Balkan states
will get access to pre-accession funds, helping
them to bridge the gap between the region and
its neighbours who are more advanced in terms
of integration with the EU31. The experience of
former and present applicant countries (inclu-
ding Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland in the
West) shows that granting a country the appli-
cant status almost automatically entails incre-
ased foreign investment. In the EU terminology,
the five Western Balkan states are currently Òpo-
tential membersÓ, which status entails no me-
asurable benefits32.
Ð possibly, select individual countries meeting
the applicant criteria from among the Balkan fi-
ve (being Croatia in the first place), and enter in-
to negotiations with them. As a result of the po-
licy whereby the Western Balkan countries are
treated as one whole, those better prepared for
integration are levelled down, which ultimately
delays the integration process, possibly to sub-
stantial extent. The conclusions of the Thessalo-
niki summit theoretically provide for such treat-
ment (no Òreduced fareÓ in the integration pro-
cess due to political situation Ð each country
should be evaluated separately in terms of its
compliance with the EU criteria), but this does
not translate into any action on the part Brus-
sels. For instance, the latter fails to appreciate
the integration progress made by Croatia in
comparison with the rest of the countries33;
Ð require progress in the refugee returns process
as a precondition of recognising a given country
(or region, as in the case of Kosovo) as comply-
ing with EU standards in terms of ethnic minori-
ty rights. The example of Bosnia shows that re-
turns take place on a massive scale where they
are not impeded by the prevalent practice of law
enforcement. In countries where, unlike in Bo-
snia, the international community cannot direc-
tly enforce the necessary legal amendments and
changes to the legal practice, it seems advisable
to maximise external pressure, even to the point
of specifying a percentage threshold of returns
based on which the return process can be reco-
gnised as ÒsatisfactoryÓ34;
Ð open accession negotiations with the Western
Balkan states without waiting until their politi-
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cal status is ultimately determined. In spite of
the general rule that only independent states
may join the EU, this solution would be in ke-
eping with the EUÕs practice hitherto (negotia-
tions with the divided Cyprus); besides, the Eu-
ropean Union is probably the only framework
within which the status of some Western Balkan
countries / regions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ko-
sovo) can ever be determined Ð within the Union
state borders a no longer a barrier to the free
movement of persons and there exist successful
autonomous formations that enjoy varying de-
grees of political or cultural separateness (e.g.
Catalonia, the Basque Country, Northern Ireland
or the Aland Islands). If the EU chooses to conti-
nue enforcing the Òone BosniaÓ policy, it should
stick to the rule of talking exclusively to the cen-
tral government in Sarajevo, thus, in a w a y, for-
cing this government to be effective (such a m o-
ve, however, would be difficult to justify given
the fact that the EU has entered into negotiations
with Pristina without consulting Belgrade).
In a recent testimony to the US House of Repre-
sentatives, an American diplomat acclaimed for
his efforts for the restoration of peace in the Bal-
kans said: ÒIn order to make the vision of a futu-
re within Europe more credible, the European
Union needs to stop treating the Balkans as a di-
stant region that needs to be stabilized and be-
gin to view it as a neighboring area into which
the EU intends to expandÓ35.
For several times in its history, the European
Union faced great challenges, the outcome of
which was unpredictable at the time the given
idea was conceived. A common currency, aboli-
tion of internal borders, absorption of the new
Mediterranean democracies with long records of
dictatorial rule (Spain, Greece, Portugal), the au-
tomatic inclusion of the former DDR following
the German unification, and, finally, the admis-
sion of post-communist countries from Eastern
Europe, in which the 50 years of the Moscow-
controlled communism affected the mentality,
attitudes towards work, etc, much more deeply
than the Òdollar communismÓ of the former
Yugoslavia36 Ð all of these are examples of under-
takings in which what mattered was the idea,
and not mere economic calculation. Today Brus-
sels faces the challenge of integrating the Balkan
Òblack holeÓ into Europe, and apparently it hesi-
tates to take the final decision. As it promises to
take up this challenge, we should remember the
words of Chris Patten, the EU Commissioner for
External Relations, who said at the Western Bal-
kans Democracy Forum in Thessaloniki in April
2002: ÒThe choice for us in this case is very cle-
ar: either we export stability to the Balkans, or
the Balkans export instability to usÓ37.
Stanis¸aw Tekieli 
This text was completed in November 2003
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1 The European prospects of the Western Balkans were as-
serted for the first time, less plainly, during the Balkans Ð
EU summit in 2000 in Zagreb. This assertion was repeated
during the European Council meetings in Feira (2000), Co-
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1998
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1999
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2000
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4.5
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3
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6
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